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Abstract 
 
 
This study re-examines the theory of legal-origin on the basis of a new longitudinal 
dataset for four OECD countries (UK, USA, France and Germany) over a long time 
span 1970-2005. It observes that the civil law countries (France and Germany) 
provided better minority shareholder protection and creditor protection relating to 
debtors’ control while the  common law countries (UK and USA) provided better 
creditor protection relating to credit contract and insolvency. Through dynamic 
panel data modelling our study shows that minority shareholder protection has a 
long-term favourable effect only on stock market listing of firms and debtors’ 
control has a similar effect on credit market expansion while the credit contract 
component of creditor protection has the opposite effect. Thus, our study questions 
the proposition that common-law countries provide more protection to their 
shareholders and creditors; it also casts doubt on the related proposition that 
shareholder and creditor protection promotes financial development.  
Keywords:  Shareholder protection, Creditor Protection, Investor Protection, 
Corporate Governance, Law and Finance. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The idea that law matters for a proper capitalist development can be traced back to 
the writings of famous German social scientist, Max Weber. Comparing the 
experience of industrialising countries of Western Europe with other countries 
Weber concluded that a rational legal system is a precondition for the emergence of 
capitalism. Some legal scholars call it ‘endowment perspective’ because it treats 
legal system as an endowment (created by fixed investment) which determines the 
path of development ‘without itself being subject to change’ (for details see 
Milhaupt and Pistor, 2008, pp.18-22). 
 
North (1990) had a similar viewpoint. He argued that rich nations have managed to 
form proper institutions that protect property rights and enforcement contracts while 
poor countries lack these institutions and so fail to develop.  
 
The works of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (henceforth, ‘LLSV’, 
1997, 1998) and the subsequent works by them and their followers (see La Porta et 
al., 1999, 2000; 2006, 2008; Djankov et al., 2003; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, 2003; 
Beck et al., 2003a, 2003b; Botero et al., 2004) infused  a strong ‘leximetric’ flavour 
to this ‘endowment perspective’ of law.  La Porta and his collaborators and 
followers  used (by and large) binary variables (0, 1) to quantify the quality of 
various types of law existing in a large number of countries protecting the interests 
of the their shareholders, creditors and labourers (these are what we call ‘leximetric’ 
data). The countries were classified according to their ‘legal origin’: English 
common law and civil law are two broad categories. The civil law systems were 
 2
further sub-divided into those of French, German and Scandinavian origin. Through 
various cross-section regression studies of these ‘leximetric’ data, it was argued that 
English common law systems are more market-friendly; they provide higher level 
of shareholder and creditor protection to promote financial development and create 
more employment opportunities by providing less protection of their labour.  
 
This literature connects with other contemporary works which show financial 
development promotes economic growth (see King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997, 
2001, 2003; Levine and Zervos 1998; Levine et al 2000; Beck et al 2000b; 
Claessens and Laeven, 2003). Hence, the conclusion that follows from this whole 
gamut of literature is that legal origin matters for economic development. Some 
works even find that the common law countries grew faster than the civil-law 
countries (Mahoney, 2001). 
 
There are two inter-linked postulates that can be found in this literature:  ‘Quality of 
Law’ or ‘law matters’ and ‘Legal Origin’ (see also our earlier paper, Armour et al 
2009a): 
 
1. ‘Quality of Law’:  Legal rules shape economic outcomes according to how far 
they support market-based economic activity as suggested in new institutional 
economics (North,1990).  It is argued that legal protection of the interests of the 
shareholders and creditors will increase the flow of investments and enhance the 
availability of external finance to firms (La Porta et al. 1998, 2008; Djankov et al. 
2003; Claessens & Laeven 2003).  
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2. ‘Legal Origin’: The quality of legal institutions varies systematically with the 
‘origin’ of a country’s legal system—that is, whether it falls into the Anglo-
American ‘common law’, or French, German or Scandinavian ‘civil law’ systems.   
 
LLSV and others asserted the superiority of common law because of ‘adaptability’ 
and ‘political’ factors (Beck et al., 2003a and Botero et al., 2004): 
 
The ‘adaptability’ argument can be traced back to Hayek (1960). It is related to the 
process of framing new rules. Judges interpret the law in common law countries; 
this ability to shape the law on a case-by-case basis helps to make legal regulation 
more adaptable to changing circumstances. In civil law countries judges are bound 
by long explicit laws and codes leaving them with little discretion so that civil law 
systems may suffer from excessive rigidity, as changes may only be made by fits 
and starts through legislation.  
 
The ‘political’ factor focuses on the greater independence provided to the judiciary 
under common law system. Therefore, the common law judges are less susceptible 
to influence by the legislature, and are better able to protect individual property 
rights from encroachment by the state. In contrast, in a civil law system, the 
legislature has greater control over legal institutions, including judicial appointment, 
selection and tenure. Hence, the judiciary are less able to protect individual property 
rights from the clutches of the state.  In the words of Mahoney (2001, 505): 
 
‘There are structural differences between common and civil law, most notably the 
greater degree of judicial independence in the former and the lower level of scrutiny 
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of executive action in the latter, that provide governments with more scope for 
alteration of property and contract rights in civil law countries’. 
 
The works of LLSV and their followers, which support ‘the endowment perspective 
of law’, have created a furore in the academic world. At the same time, their works 
have driven the legal reform policies of the World Bank and other institutional 
organisations towards Anglo-Saxon legal system (thereby adding another dimension 
to globalisation, which can be called ‘globalisation of law’). The World Bank has 
funded much of the subsequent works of LLSV and created a database that assigns 
score to each country for their legal institutions to protect the interests of 
shareholders, creditors, employers (vis-à-vis employees) and other stakeholders.  
 
In this perspective, we shall re-examine the LLSV theory on the basis of a new 
dataset available from the source of Centre for Business Research, CBR (University 
of Cambridge, UK) for four OECD countries (UK, USA, France and Germany) over 
a long time span 1970-2005.1 In the LLSV theory of legal origin, the three 
countries, England, France and Germany, may be termed as “mother countries”. 
These are essentially countries where different legal systems originated, and 
subsequently spread to developing countries often through colonisation and 
conquest.  In the US, not a mother country, the Anglo-Saxon system reached a high 
level of development and the model was exported to other countries.    
                                                 
1
  CBR data over a long time span, 1970-2005 are available for five countries: four 
OECD countries covered in this paper and India. Indian data on shareholder 
protection were examined in a separate paper (Sarkar, 2009).  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a critique of 
the LLSV theory.  Sections 3 and 4 outline the results of our empirical analysis and 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Legal Origin Theory: A Critique 
 
The legal origin postulate suffers from serious conceptual problems. Scholars of 
comparative law argue that the classification of countries by reference to legal 
origins is not always clear and point out that in reality most legal systems are 
hybrids. For instance, South African law derives from both civil law and common 
law traditions; Japanese company law used to be based on the German model but, 
since the 1950s, has been heavily influenced by the US law; Swiss company law is 
influenced by the UK legal system and, due to the influence of the EU, UK law 
itself has become more ‘continental’ (Siems, 2007). 
 
The mechanisms by which legal origins exert their influence—through the 
‘political’ and ‘adaptability’ channels are strongly questioned by the modern 
scholars of corporate law.  For example, under current French practice judges 
interpret the law whereas English judges on the other hand have less scope than 
before in view of the detailed descriptions contained in modern English law, such as 
the company law (Deakin & Singh 2008).  The French judges are also able to have 
discretions by appealing to the Roman law concept of “good faith”. 
 
Furthermore, the empirical base of the LLSV theory can be questioned and a 
number of strong critical points can be raised (see also, Armour et al, 2009a): 
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1. LLSV data lack transparency. For any index to be a meaningful representation of 
the effects of legal rules across different jurisdictions, it must contain coding which 
corresponds to the state of the law in the different countries under review. It should 
take into account relevant cross-national differences in the operation of legal rules. 
There is always room for differences of view in the way that legal rules are 
interpreted. When the coding of LLSV’s “shareholder rights” indices was checked 
by independent experts, numerous coding errors were revealed, casting serious 
doubts on the main findings of LLSV (Spamann, 2006, 2008). 
 
2. A second problem relates to the selection of variables. A functional theory of how 
legal rules work in relation to economic variables is needed to guide the selection 
process. In the absence of such theory, there lies a danger of “home country bias” 
on the part of the researchers constructing the index. LLSV’s legal indices have 
been criticized on these bases (Ahlering and Deakin, 2007).  
 
3. A third problem concerns the aggregation of the variables coded. The indices are 
constructed from the unweighted sums of the various measures. It is not clear how 
significant each variable is in its contribution to the overall business environment.  
The scores given to particular variables or groups of variables should be weighted 
on a country by country basis to reflect the comparative law principle of functional 
equivalents: the same variable may play a completely different functional role in 
different countries, or different variables may play the same role, with their relative 
importance varying from one context to another (see Ahlering and Deakin, 2007). 
For example, regulatory takeover codes are generally thought to play a major role in 
underpinning minority shareholder rights and encouraging the dispersion of 
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ownership in some common law systems, such as the UK and Australia, but this 
type of regulation is absent in the United States.  In the latter country certain 
specific rules of securities law, the law of fiduciary duties and a more permissive 
approach to shareholder-led litigation play a similar role (Armour and Skeel, 2007). 
 
4. Fourthly, the legal indices in large part rely only on formal legal rules—that is, 
the ‘law on the books’, as opposed to the ‘law in action’. Differences in judicial 
quality, legal procedure, social norms, and a host of other factors may make the 
operation of legal rules in practice very different from their formal characterization. 
The gap between formal law and law in practice does not affect all countries 
equally; this poses a problem for the indexing methodology. Moreover, the form 
taken by a particular law may reflect the practical impact of that rule on parties 
subject to it.  That may depend on factors outside the scope of the legal indices, 
including social and cultural norms beyond the law. The social or economic effect 
of a given legal rule can only be understood by seeing law as part of a system of 
interlinked norms, some of which are extra-legal in nature (Zweigert and Kötz, 
1998). 
 
5. The majority of the LLSV indices provide a cross-sectional view of the law. Most 
of them describe the law as it stood in the second half of the 1990s. It does not 
provide any idea regarding the direction of causality. While a proper legal 
framework could promote financial development and economic growth, it is also 
plausible that financial development influences the creation of appropriate legal 
environment. A number of case studies of the evolution of company law at the 
national level suggest that for both USA and UK financial market developments 
preceded legal change (Cheffins 2001; Coffee 2001).  
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With the above points in mind, CBR (Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge, UK) scholars have constructed new indices on shareholder protection. 
The CBR approach differs from that of LLSV in a number of respects (see Armour 
et al 2009a):   
 
Firstly, CBR indices take into account a wider range of legal and regulatory 
information, which are functional equivalent of ‘hard’ laws whereas LLSV focused 
mainly on ‘positive’ legal rules. All primary legal sources are set out in the 
documents constituting the CBR datasets, a practice not followed by LLSV.2 
 
A second difference is that a wider range of values is used in CBR data to consider 
the effects of a given rule. On the contrary, many of the LLSV codings use binary 
variables (0, 1): for the existence a given rule the code is 1 otherwise it is 0. This 
procedure does not take into account the possibility of ambiguity or uncertainty in 
the interpretation of a legal provision. In the CBR data intermediate values between 
0 and 1 are arrived at based on interpretative judgments by legal experts.    
 
Thirdly, the CBR data cover a wider range of legal norm than LLSV. In practice, 
many rules of company law and securities law are ‘default rules’ which may apply 
or not depending on how the parties to particular transactions choose to deal with 
                                                 
2
 These are available online, on the website of the Centre for Business Research (CBR) 
at the University of Cambridge. See 〈http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/ project2-
20.htm〉. 
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them.  The norms of corporate governance codes, which follow the ‘comply or 
explain’ approach, offer an illustration of this: companies have a choice of either 
conforming to the relevant norm, or disclosing their reasons for not complying with 
it.  However, this is also a feature of many statutory rules of core company law. 
Each of these types was included within the CBR coding.  
 
Fourthly, and most fundamentally, CBR indices are all longitudinal.   Legal rules 
were coded as they have evolved over time.  These data allow us to track legal 
changes over time and to analyze their relationship to economic development.   
 
In the next two sections, we shall re-examine the LLSV legal origin hypothesis on 
the basis of these CBR data for four OECD countries (UK, USA, France and 
Germany) over a long time span 1970-2005.  
 
3. Legal Protection of Shareholders and Creditors: Common Law vs. Civil Law 
 
3.1 Shareholder Protection 
 
In the CBR data on shareholder protection there are 60 legal variables for each 
country; each variable has 36 annual observations over the period 1970-2005(for the 
exhaustive list of variables considered see the original data source mentioned in 
footnote 2). Every variable takes a value between zero (the lowest level of 
protection) and one (the highest level of protection); many take intermediate values. 
Thus, if a country were to have the maximum level of protection, the indicators 
would sum up to 60 assuming uniform weight for all the variables (we shall use 
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unweighted average so that the minimum value of the index is zero and the 
maximum value is one).   
 
In order to make comparative statements about legal protection for shareholders in 
different countries it would be useful to aggregate the variables. In line with much 
of the literature, we use the un-weighted sum of all variables as an aggregated index 
of shareholder protection. This procedure thus assumes that all variables are equally 
important which is of course unlikely to be true but assigning unequal weights risks 
the exercise becoming too arbitrary.  A simple un-weighted average of all 60 
variables (hereafter ALLSP) gives an aggregate picture of shareholder protection. 
Corporate law is often designed to protect the dispersed shareholders from mangers 
and board and also to protect minority shareholders from the majority (see Coffee, 
2002; Kraakman et al, 2004). Therefore, we shall use two broad sub-categories of 
ALLSP: shareholder protection against board and management (hereafter SPBRD) 
– the unweighted average of 42 variables and shareholder protection against other 
shareholders (minority shareholder protection - often called investor protection, 
hereafter SPMIN) – the unweighted average of the remaining 18 variables. 
 
The two sub-categories are described below: 
 
(a) Protection against board and management (SPBRD):  It covers all the rules and 
regulations that protect the shareholders against the activities of board and 
management. These rules deal with the powers of the general meeting of the 
shareholders ( regarding the amendments of the articles of association, mergers and 
divisions, sale of substantial assets of the company, dividend distributions, election 
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of  the board of directors, directors’ appointment,  remunerations and dismissal, 
directors’ self-dealing of substantial transactions etc.),  the agenda setting power of 
the shareholders in the general meeting, the power of the shareholders to call for an 
extra-ordinary shareholder meeting, the shareholders’ right to  demand information 
and to get  access to the register of shareholders and  beneficial owners etc. 
 
(b) Protection of minority shareholders against the majority shareholders (SPMIN): 
It covers the issue of quorum in the extra-ordinary shareholder meeting, 
supermajority requirements (e.g., 2/3 or 3/4) for amendments of the articles of 
association, mergers, and voluntary liquidations, provision of protection of out-
voted minority shareholders, prohibition of voting by interested shareholders, 
disclosure of major share ownership,  provision of mandatory bid and  public offer 
for acquisition etc.  
 
In Table 1 we have presented the quinquennial average shareholder protection 
indices (three series, ALLSP, SPBRD and SPMIN) for the four countries under 
study.  Through simple averaging, we have also calculated the quinquennial average 
shareholder protection of common law group (UK and USA) and the civil law 
group (France and Germany). All these are plotted in a number of diagrams.  
 
Figure 1 shows that in the first quinquennium (1970-74), UK had the lowest level of 
aggregate shareholder protection (ALLSP) while Germany had the highest level of 
aggregate shareholder protection followed by USA and France.  In the subsequent 
quinquennia, all the four countries made a number of changes in their law to 
provide more and more shareholder protection. Changes were more pronounced in 
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UK and France; while Germany tried to catch up in the 1990s, the US law lagged 
behind.  Hence, in the first 6 years of the current millennium for which we have the 
relevant CBR data there is not much difference in the state of legal protection of 
shareholders in the three countries.  Our aggregation at the level of legal origin (see 
also our earlier study, Sarkar and Singh, 2010) shows that in each quinquennium 
shareholder protection is more in the civil law countries than that in the common 
law countries (Figure 2).  
 
At the disaggregative level, it appears that in the field of shareholder protection 
relating to board and management (SPBRD) there is not much gap between UK and 
France and between Germany and USA (Figure 3).  We find not much difference 
between common law and civil law (Figure 4). That means the distinction between 
the two groups arises in the field of minority shareholder protection (SPMIN). Both 
Germany and France provided more and more minority shareholder protection in 
contrast to its steady decline in the USA and stagnation in the UK (Figures 5 and 6).   
To examine the same question at a more rigorous level, consider all the 36 years 
(1970-2005) of observations for each country to get a panel dataset of 144 
observations. We use the dummy variable for common law origin countries (COM) 
and fit the following regression with a time-trend: 
    
(1)    Y =   a + b.COM + c.t 
 
where Y = the  shareholder protection index (ALLSP or SPBRD or SPMIN), COM  
is the dummy variable = 1 for common law countries (UK, USA) and zero for other 
countries (France and Germany) and t is the time-trend. 
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This regression procedure shows that common law countries and civil law countries 
do not differ in shareholder protection relating to board (SPBRD) – the dummy 
(COM) is not statistically significant. Contrary to the LLSV legal origin hypothesis, 
the minority shareholder protection and so the aggregate shareholder protection is 
lower in the common law countries – the dummy is negative and highly significant 
for the dependent variables, SPMIN and ALLSP (Table 2, Part A). Our result holds 
irrespective of whether we add time-trend in the regression equation (1). 
 
3.2 Creditors Protection 
 
As with the shareholder rights indices, the construction of CBR creditor rights index 
was based on a wide range of creditor rights variables over the period, 1970-2005 
(for the exhaustive list of variables considered see the original data source 
mentioned in footnote 2). These variables fall into three sub-categories reflecting 
three separate ways in which creditors may be protected by the law: Debtor Control 
(CRDC), Credit Contracts (CRCC) and Insolvency (CRINS).  
 
(a) Debtor control (CRDC):  It consists of all the restrictions imposed on the 
activities of firms so as to reduce their risk of default on debt obligations. This set of 
rules deals with the amount of minimum capital required to start a firm, restriction 
on the payment of dividends defined by reference to legal capital, the rights of 
courts  to pierce the corporate veil to protect creditors, transaction avoidance in 
insolvency, directors’ liability with respect to creditors’ interests, public 
enforcement of liabilities of directors in insolvency etc. 
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(b) Credit contracts (CRCC): It is concerned with creditors acquiring rights by 
contract such as the ability to take various forms of security. This set of rules covers 
mandatory insolvency set-off, clauses in bond agreements providing for majority 
voting on renegotiation of default, legal procedures to enforce outside insolvency 
proceedings, mortgages of land, financial collateral (cash, bank a/c, securities), 
retention of title clauses (over original goods and over proceeds of sale of original 
goods) in insolvency proceedings, registration of security, possibility of 
enforcement of security without court order. 
 
(c) Insolvency (CRINS): This sub-index concerns bankruptcy law. Various aspects 
of insolvency law are examined to see whether it further creditors' (as opposed to 
debtors') interests. It deals with the legal provision for both liquidation and 
rehabilitation,  triggering of insolvency proceedings (whether it is the duty of 
company/shareholders/directors to file for insolvency proceedings on balance  sheet 
trigger or whether a single creditor can initiate liquidation proceedings), 
stay/moratorium in liquidation and  rehabilitation proceedings, control in 
rehabilitation proceedings (whether directors remain in control for day-to-day 
management decisions), appointment of trustee or  manager (whether secured 
creditors or unsecured creditors or shareholders or court vote to appoint trustee), 
voting on plan for exit, priorities in liquidation and rehabilitation proceedings.  
 
In Table 3, we have presented the quinquennial average creditor protection indices: 
the aggregate series, ALLCR and its three constituent sub-categories, CRDC, 
CRCC and CRINS for the four countries under study (the indices are simple 
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averages of all the relevant variables - assuming the range of values between 0 and 
1).  Through simple averaging, we have also calculated the quinquennial average 
creditor protection of the common law group (UK and USA) and the civil law group 
(France and Germany). All these are plotted in a number of diagrams (Figures 7 to 
14).  
 
In the first quinquennium (1970-74), Germany had the highest level of aggregate 
creditor protection (ALLCR), closely followed by UK and USA while France had 
much lower level of creditor protection. Subsequently the level of creditor 
protection improved in all the countries although at different paces. In the process, 
France came closer to USA while UK surpassed Germany. However, in the latest 
period (2000-5) for which we have data Germany regained its position (Figure 7). 
Our aggregation at the level of legal origin shows that in each quinquennium 
creditor protection is more in the common law countries than that in the civil law 
countries (Figure 8) in keen contrast to what we have observed for shareholder 
protection (Figure 2). However, the civil law group showed a tendency to catch up 
in different quinquennia; during 2000-5, both groups have the same level of creditor 
protection (0.61). 
 
Considering different sub-categories of creditor protection, it can be observed that 
in the field of debtor control (CRDC) Germany has maintained the topmost position 
far above all others throughout our period of study (Figure 9).  Thanks to Germany, 
civil law group has been better placed in this aspect of creditor protection 
throughout the period. However, the common law group is observed to catch up as 
both German and French CRDCs show a slow declining trend since the mid-1980s 
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while the UK CRDC shows a regular increase throughout the period and US CRDC 
shows a similar tendency since 1985-89 (Figure 10).  
 
In the field of creditor contract (CRCC), however, USA was initially on the top; 
subsequently UK took that position while Germany and France remain far behind 
these two common law countries (Figure 11).  Obviously, in this field common law 
group is better placed while there is a clear tendency for the civil law group to catch 
up, thanks to legal changes in France throughout the period since 1975-79 (Figure 
12). 
 
In the matter of creditor protection relating to insolvency (CRINS), UK has 
maintained the topmost position far above all others in all the quinquennia between 
1970 and 1999. Initially Germany had the least creditor protection relating to 
insolvency –very recently, Germany made some drastic changes in insolvency law 
and reached the level of protection offered by the UK. France also improved its 
insolvency law in the 1980s and 1990s while the USA made some minor 
improvements in their law in the 1970s (Figure 13).  In view of all these changes, 
since the early 1980s, the insolvency law in the civil law region started improving 
and coming closer to that in the common law region (read UK). By 2000-5, it 
surpassed the insolvency law in the common law countries (Figure 14).  
 
Replicating our dummy variable analysis [by considering various creditor protection 
series taken one at a time as the dependent variable, Y, on the right hand side of 
equation (1)], we can observe that the civil law group has significantly higher 
creditor protection in the field of debtor control. The common law group, on the 
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other hand, has significantly higher creditor protection in the field of credit 
contracts and insolvency. The supremacy of common law in these two sub-
categories exerted the dominating influence in showing their significantly higher 
aggregate creditor protection (Table 2, Part B).  
 
To sum up, our study of the leximetric data of four major countries (from the 
perspective of legal origin) over a long span of time (1970-2005) provides no clear 
verdict in favour of the LLSV proposition that the common law is superior to civil 
law in protecting the interests of shareholders and creditors. In the matter of 
aggregate shareholder protection, civil law is superior and in field of aggregate 
creditor protection, the opposite is true. The supremacy of civil law arises because 
of better minority shareholder protection in the civil law countries. There is also a 
tendency towards divergence because of declining minority shareholder protection 
in the USA coupled with its sluggish improvement in the UK. 
 
The supremacy of common law in providing overall creditor protection is due to 
high level of protection offered by USA and UK in the field of credit contract and 
by UK in the field of insolvency.  In both cases, civil law showed a tendency 
towards catching up - in the former case, France provided the driving force and in 
the latter case, the driving force came from both France and Germany. In the field 
of creditor protection relating to debtors’ control, the supremacy of civil law is 
provided by Germany. This aspect of creditor protection also exhibited a tendency 
towards convergence because of legal changes in both UK and USA.  
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4.  Does Law Matter? 
 
In this section, we shall examine ‘whether law matters’. For this, two propositions 
are considered. 
1. A Country with higher shareholder protection experiences greater development of 
its stock markets.  
2. A Country with higher creditor protection experiences greater development of its 
credit market. 
 
To examine the first proposition we shall consider the following indicators of stock 
market development (used one at a time) along with shareholder protection indices 
(taken one at a time) discussed in the earlier section (SPBRD, SPMIN and ALLSP): 
 
1. Market capitalisation or the value of  the shares of listed firms to GDP, MKAPY. 
2. Value of total shares traded on the stock exchange to GDP, VTRDY. 
3. Turnover ratio, which is the ratio of the value of total shares traded to average 
real market capitalization, TURN.  
4. Number of domestically incorporated companies listed in the country’s stock 
exchange per million of population, LISTPOPM. 
 
To examine the second proposition we shall consider the two indicators of credit 
market development (used one at a time) along with creditor protection indices 
(taken one at a time) discussed in the earlier section (CRDC, CRCC, CRINS and 
ALLCR): 
 
 19
1. Domestic credit provided by the banking sector as percentage of GDP, DCBY; 
2. Domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP, DCPVTY. 
The data source of the three series, MKAPY, VTRDY and TURN is the Financial 
Structure Dataset of World Bank (see Beck et al 2000a).  The data on legal 
protection of shareholders and creditors are from online CBR (Cambridge, UK) 
source (as already mentioned). All other data are from the World Development 
Indicators of World Bank.  
 
The periodic (mostly quinquennial) averages of the indicators of stock market and 
credit market development are plotted in Figures 15 to 20.  These show that for all 
the indicators of stock market development (excepting turnover ratio), the common 
law countries (UK and USA) are better placed. They had higher market 
capitalisation and value of trading (both relative to GDP) throughout the period 
1976-2005 for which we have data.  This is also true for stock market listing (per 
million of population) over the period 1980-2005.  The picture is not so clear for 
credit market development indicators such as domestic credit provided by banking 
sector (% of GDP) and domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). For both 
indicators USA maintained its topmost position throughout the period of study 
while UK remained at the bottom during 1970-1990.  
 
We have also replicated the dummy variable analysis of annual data conducted in 
the earlier section to supplement our graphical analysis of quinquennial average 
data. For stock market development indicators we have considered additional 
dummies (intercept and slope dummies) for the period, 2001-2005 in order to take 
into account the impact of dotcom bubble bursting and subsequent recovery.  This 
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procedure supports our graphical observation: the common-law group has 
statistically significant higher market capitalisation, higher value of stock trading 
(both relative to GDP) and higher number of listed firms (per million of 
population); only for turnover ratio the difference is not statistically significant 
(Table 5). As for credit market - domestic credit provided by the banking sector 
(percentage of GDP) is significantly higher in the common law group, thanks to the 
experience of USA; for the other indicator the difference between the groups is not 
statistically significant.  
 
Now the crucial question is how far this higher financial development in the 
common-law group is due to shareholder and creditor protection. We shall seek an 
answer to these questions through dynamic panel data modelling (discussed below). 
To control for the level of economic activity of a country we shall consider real 
GDP in purchasing power parity constant dollars, deflated by population, PPPCY. 
From the World Development Indicators of World Bank we get the PPPCY for the 
period 1975-2005. Our period of analysis is determined by data availability. For 
credit market-creditor protection link, our period of analysis is 1975-2005. 
Similarly, for three other indicators of stock market development our period of 
analysis is 1976-2005.  For stock market listing a shorter period 1980-2005 is 
considered. 
 
Dynamic Panel Data Analysis: Estimates of Short run and Long-run Relationships 
 
For a large time dimension of panel data (as we have here), Pesaran and Smith 
(1995) showed that the traditional procedures for estimation of pooled models, such 
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as the fixed effects, instrumental variables, and generalized method of moments 
(GMM) ‘can produce inconsistent, and potentially very misleading estimates of the 
average values of the parameters in dynamic panel data models unless the slope 
coefficients are in fact identical (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, p.622).  Therefore, to 
ascertain the nature of the relationships between financial development and 
shareholder/creditor protection we shall use the Pesaran-Shin dynamic panel data 
analysis. 
 
We start with a postulate of long-run relationship involving X (four stock market 
development indicators such as MKAPY, VTRDY, TURN and LISTPOPM and two 
credit market development indicators such as DCBY and DCPVTY, taken one at a 
time, in natural log), Y (per capita GDP, PPPCY in natural log) and Z (various 
shareholder and creditor protection indexes taken one at a time): 
 
(2)   Xit = ψi Yit + pii Zit   + η it 
 
where i (=1,2,3,4) represents countries, t (=1,2,… T) represents periods (years), 
ψi and pii   are the long-run parameters and  ηit is the error term. 
  
We are interested to know whether there exist long-term and short-term effects of  Z 
(shareholder or creditor protection) along with Y (per capita GDP measuring 
economic activities) on X (stock market development or credit market development 
indicators respectively) and whether there exists a stable adjustment path from the 
short-term relationship (if any) to the long-run relationship.   
                                                                           
Following Pesaran and Shin (1999), our panel data analysis is based on the 
following error correction representation: 
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                                       p-1              q-1                  r-1       
(4) ∆Xit = θi(η it-1) +   Σλij ∆Xi, t-j + Σψ ik ∆Y i, t-k + Σpiil ∆Zi, t-l + µι +  φit                
                                     j =1               k = 0              l = 0 
 
  
where ∆ is the difference operator, θi is the country-specific error-correcting speed 
of adjustment term, λij,ψik  and piij are the coefficients of the lagged variables, µι is 
the country fixed effect 
 
and φit is the disturbances term. The existence of a 
meaningful long-run relationship with a stable adjustment dynamics requires θi < 0. 
 
Under this general structure, we can have three alternative models. On one extreme, 
we can have dynamic fixed effect estimators (DFE) where intercepts are allowed to 
vary across the countries and all other parameters and error variances are 
constrained to be the same. At the other extreme, one can estimate separate 
equations for each country and calculate the mean of the estimates to get a glimpse 
of the over-all picture. This is called mean group estimator (MG). Pesaran and 
Smith (1995) showed that MG gives consistent estimates of the averages of 
parameters. The intermediate alternative is pooled mean group (PMG) estimator, 
suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1999). It allows intercepts, short-run coefficients 
and error variances to differ freely across the countries but the long run coefficients 
are constrained to be the same; that means, ψi =  ψ and  pii = pi for all i while θi may 
differ from group to group.  
 
Using the STATA ado developed by Blackburne and Frank (2007) we have 
estimated all the three alternative models, MG, PMG and DFE. Based on Lag 
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Exclusion Wald Test for each variable separately we have determined the lag 
structure (p, q, r).3   Our findings are presented below: 
 
1. In none of the three models, we find short-term or long-term effect (favourable or 
unfavourable) of aggregate shareholder protection, ALLSP on the four stock market 
development indicators.  This is also true for the shareholder protection relating to 
Board, SPBRD (Table 5, Parts IA and B). In our earlier study (Sarkar and 
Singh,2010) we arrived at the similar conclusion on the basis of  a time-series 
analysis of the individual country cases. 
 
2.  As regards the impact of minority shareholder protection on stock market 
development indicators, the same conclusion cannot be drawn because of one 
remarkable exception. This is the case of stock market listing in the DFE model: the 
effect of minority shareholder protection on stock market listing is negative in the 
short-run but positive in the long-run and there exists a stable adjustment path from 
the short-run relationship to the long-run relationship. A series of Hausman tests 
support the DFE model and so it can be concluded that minority shareholder 
protection matters for stock market listing.4  There is another minor exception: a 
negative short-term effect on turnover ratio was observed in the DFE model but no 
significant long-term effect (Table 5, Part IC-(iii) and (iv)). 
                                                 
3
  We have considered a uniform lag-structure for all the countries, as the STATA ado used here does 
not have this option. It is theoretically possible to consider different lag structures for different 
countries on the basis of some information criteria.  
 
4
 Our individual country case studies.(reported in Sarkar and Singh, 2010) could not find this result 
that supports the ‘law matters’ proposition of the  legal origin theory. 
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3. Both the MG and DFE models show no short-term or long-term effect of 
aggregate creditor protection (ALLCR) on any indicator of credit market 
development. The PMG model, however, shows a negative long-term effect on the 
two indicators of credit market development but there exists no stable adjustment 
path from short-term (positive relationship in one case and  no relationship in 
another case) to long-term (Table 5, Part IIA). The series of Hausman tests support 
the DFE model. 
 
4.  Two models (PMG and DFE) show long-term favourable effects of  creditor 
protection relating to debtor control (CRDC) on both the indicators of credit market 
development; there is, however, no short-term effect. Only in the DFE model, the 
adjustment process from an insignificant short-term effect to a significant positive 
long-term effect is stable for both the indicators of credit market development. The 
Hausman test supports the DFE model for the case of private credit-GDP ratio 
giving more credence to the findings (Table 5, Part II B). 
 
5. As regards the impact of creditor protection relating to credit contract (CRCC), 
the opposite (of what we have observed for CRDC) holds good: two models (PMG 
and DFE) show long-term negative effect of CRCC (with no significant short-term 
effect) on both the indicators of credit market development. In each case, the 
Hausman test supports the DFE model, which shows a stable adjustment process 
from a short-term no relationship to long-term negative relationship (Table 5, Part II 
C). 
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6. The PMG model shows that the long-term impact of creditor protection relating 
to insolvency (CRINS) is negative on both the indicators of credit market 
development and there exists a stable adjustment process from insignificant short-
term relationship to long-term negative relationship. Neither MG model nor DFE 
model shows a significant short-term or long-term effect. Hausman test supports the 
DFE model. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
Analysing the available data of the legal origin ‘mother’ countries over a long time 
span, 1970-2005, our study finds no clear verdict in favour of the proposition that 
the common law countries provide more protection of shareholders and creditors. 
The civil law countries (France and Germany) provide more minority shareholder 
protection and creditor protection relating to debtors’ control; the common law 
countries (UK and USA) provide better creditor protection in the field of credit 
contract and insolvency.  
 
Furthermore, our study questions the related proposition that ‘law matters’; it finds 
no clear evidence in favour of a favourable effect of shareholder protection on stock 
market development and creditor protection on credit market development. Using 
dynamic panel data models it concludes that only one aspect of shareholder 
protection matters for stock market development; it is minority shareholder 
protection which is observed to have a long-term favourable effect on only one 
indicator of stock market development, namely the number of firms listed in the 
stock market relative to total population. Perhaps the minority shareholder 
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protection discourages firms to list their shares in the short-run (we got short-term 
negative relationship) but in the long-run it popularizes the stock market giving an 
incentive for firms to rely more on stock market. 
 
On the other hand, it is observed that different components of creditor protection 
have different effects on credit market development. Debtors control component of 
creditor protection, which is stressed more in the civil-law countries, has a long-
term favourable effect on credit market expansion. The credit contract aspect of 
creditor protection, focused more in the common-law countries, has a long-term 
inimical effect on credit market development. Perhaps this aspect of creditor 
protection discourages debtors and hampers credit market expansion.  
 
To sum up, our study based on longitudinal data for four OECD countries does not 
provide an unequivocal support to the proposition that common-law countries 
provide more protection to their shareholders and creditors which in turn promote 
their stock and credit market developments.
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Table 1. Shareholder Protection in Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
(Period Averages) 
Period & Series      
       
 France Germany UK USA Common Civil 
     Law Law 
 
Board & 
Management 
(SPBRD) 
 
1970-74 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 
1975-79 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 
1980-84 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.48 
1985-89 0.55 0.51 0.54 0.49 0.52 0.53 
1990-94 0.57 0.51 0.57 0.51 0.54 0.54 
1995-99 0.58 0.52 0.64 0.52 0.58 0.55 
2000-05 0.65 0.60 0.68 0.59 0.63 0.63 
       
Minority       
(SPMIN)       
 
1970-74 0.50 0.53 0.42 0.50 0.46 0.52 
1975-79 0.50 0.54 0.43 0.54 0.49 0.52 
1980-84 0.50 0.56 0.46 0.55 0.50 0.53 
1985-89 0.54 0.56 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.55 
1990-94 0.60 0.56 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.58 
1995-99 0.54 0.58 0.47 0.42 0.45 0.56 
2000-05 0.56 0.64 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.60 
 
Aggregate       
(ALLSP)       
 
1970-74 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.48 
1975-79 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.48 
1980-84 0.48 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 
1985-89 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.53 
1990-94 0.58 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.55 
1995-99 0.57 0.54 0.59 0.49 0.54 0.56 
2000-05 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.54 0.58 0.62 
============================================================ 
Source: Calculated from CBR (University of Cambridge) data available in 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm. 
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Table 2 
Shareholder and Creditor Protection in Common Law vis-à-vis Civil Law 
Countries, 1970-2005: Dummy Variable Analysis1 
 
Series Intercept
(a) 
Dummy for   
Common Law 
Countries 
(COM) 
Time 
Trend 
(t) 
R-Square 
A.Shareholder Protection     
1.Aggregate Shareholder  
Protection (ALLSP) 
0.458*** -0.022*** 0.004*** 0.706 
2. Shareholder Protection 
Concerning Board and 
Management (SPBRD) 
0.425*** 0.004 0.005*** 0.732 
3. Minority Shareholder 
Protection (SPMIN) 
0.534*** -0.083*** 0.001*** 0.539 
B. Creditor Protection     
1. Aggregate Creditor 
Protection (ALLCR) 
0.498*** 0.024** 0.003*** 0.244 
2. Creditor Protection 
Concerning  Debtor Controls 
(CRDC) 
0.566*** -0.219*** 0.004*** 0.405 
3. Creditor Protection 
Concerning  Credit Contracts 
(CRCC) 
0.539*** 0.193*** 0.002** 0.608 
4. Creditor Protection 
Concerning  Insolvency 
(CRINS) 
0.446*** 0.048*** 0.003*** 0.437 
 
* Significant at 10 per cent level (based on robust standard errors). 
** Significant at 5 per cent level (based on robust standard errors). 
*** Significant at 1 per cent level (based on robust standard errors). 
 
1 The following regression equation has been fitted through OLS: 
    
Y = a + b.COM +c.t 
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where Y is  either  shareholder protection index (ALLSP or SPBRD or SPMIN) or 
Creditor Protection Index (ALLCR, CRDC, CRCC and CRINS), t is the time trend 
and  COM is the dummy variable = 1 for common law countries (UK, USA) and 
zero for other countries (France and Germany).   
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Table 3 
Creditors’ Protection in Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
(Period Averages) 
 
Period & Series      
       
 France Germany UK USA Common Civil 
     Law Law 
 
 
Debtors       
Control       
(CRDC)       
 
1970-74 0.47 0.77 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.62 
1975-79 0.47 0.77 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.62 
1980-84 0.49 0.83 0.42 0.31 0.37 0.66 
1985-89 0.46 0.88 0.50 0.31 0.40 0.67 
1990-94 0.46 0.88 0.57 0.45 0.51 0.67 
1995-99 0.46 0.85 0.57 0.48 0.53 0.66 
2000-05 0.45 0.77 0.55 0.48 0.51 0.61 
 
Credit        
Contracts       
(CRCC)       
 
1970-74 0.38 0.65 0.67 0.83 0.75 0.52 
1975-79 0.38 0.65 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.52 
1980-84 0.45 0.65 0.81 0.73 0.77 0.55 
1985-89 0.48 0.65 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.57 
1990-94 0.49 0.65 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.57 
1995-99 0.58 0.66 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.62 
2000-05 0.58 0.67 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.63 
 
Insolvency       
(CRINS)       
 
1970-74 0.45 0.46 0.56 0.49 0.53 0.46 
1975-79 0.45 0.46 0.56 0.49 0.53 0.46 
1980-84 0.45 0.46 0.56 0.51 0.54 0.46 
1985-89 0.53 0.46 0.58 0.51 0.55 0.50 
1990-94 0.53 0.46 0.60 0.51 0.56 0.50 
1995-99 0.55 0.50 0.60 0.51 0.56 0.52 
2000-05 0.54 0.62 0.63 0.51 0.57 0.58 
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Table 3 (contd.) 
 
Period & Series      
       
 France Germany UK USA Common Civil 
     Law Law 
 
 
 
Creditor       
Protection-
All 
(ALLCR)       
 
1970-74 0.44 0.58 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.51 
1975-79 0.44 0.58 0.58 0.52 0.55 0.51 
1980-84 0.46 0.60 0.60 0.52 0.56 0.53 
1985-89 0.50 0.61 0.63 0.52 0.57 0.56 
1990-94 0.50 0.61 0.65 0.54 0.60 0.56 
1995-99 0.54 0.62 0.65 0.55 0.60 0.58 
2000-05 0.53 0.68 0.66 0.55 0.61 0.61 
 
 
============================================================ 
 
Source: Calculated from CBR (University of Cambridge) data available in 
See 〈http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm〉. 
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 Table 4 
Stock and Credit Market Development in the Common Law vis-à-vis the Civil 
Law Countries since the 1970s: Dummy Variable Analysis1 
 
 
Series 
& 
Period of 
Analysis 
Intercept 
(a) 
Dummy 
for   
Common 
Law 
Countries 
(COM) 
Time 
Trend 
(t) 
dummy 
for 
2001- 
2005 
(d2001) 
t.dummy 
for 
2001- 
2005 
(sd2001) 
R- 
Square 
A.Stock 
Market 
Development 
Indicators 
      
Market 
Capitalisation-
GDP ratio (in 
natural log), 
LMKAPY, 
1976-2005 
-3.121** 1.212** 0.078** 3.993* -0.125* 0.91 
Value of Stock 
Trading-GDP 
ratio (in natural 
log), LVTRDY, 
1976-2005 
-5.234** 1.237** 0.146** 6.012** -0.186** 0.894 
Stock Market 
Turnover Ratio 
(in natural log), 
LTURN, 
1976-2005 
-2.112** 0.025 0.068** 2.303 -0.069 0.656 
Number of 
Firms Listed in 
the Stock 
Market per 
million of 
population (in 
natural log), 
LLISTPOPM, 
1980-2005 
2.058** 1.256** 0.006 0.951 -0.03 0.854 
B.Credit 
Market 
Development 
Indicators  
      
Domestic credit 
provided by 
banking sector 
as percentage  
of GDP (in 
4.145** .106* .024**   0.42 
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natural log), 
LDCBY, 
1970-2005 
Domestic credit 
to private sector 
as percentage of 
GDP (in natural 
log), 
LDCPVTY, 
1970-2005 
3.919*** .058 .028**   0.423 
 
* Significant at 5 per cent level (based on robust standard errors). 
** Significant at 1 per cent level (based on robust standard errors). 
1 The following regression equation has been fitted through OLS: 
Y = a + b.COM +d.t +e.d2001 +f.sd2001 
where Y is the alternative financial market (stock or credit market) development 
indicators or alternative rates of unemployment (alternatively LMKAPY, LVTRDY, 
LTURN, LLISTPOPM, LDCBY, LDCPVTY, TU, LU and YU are used), COM is 
the dummy variable = 1 for common law countries (UK, USA) and zero for other 
countries (France and Germany), , t is the time trend, d2001 is dummy for dotcom 
bubble that assumes the value zero for 1970-2000 and =1 for 2001-2005 and 
sd2001=d2001*t varies accordingly. 
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Table 5 
Short-run and Long-run Relationships between Legal Index and Finance  
Market Variables 1975/80-2005: Dynamic Panel Models 
Period of Analysis/Models1 PMG MG DFE 
I. 1976-2005    
A. Impact of Aggregate 
Shareholder Protection Index, 
ALLSP (Z)  
on  
 
  
(i)   Stock Market  
Capitalization , LMKAPY (X) 
   
Long-term Relationship    
Y (LPPPCY) 5.415*** -1.432 2.531*** 
Z  (ALLSP) 2.651 16.076 3.331 
Short-term Relationship    
θ -0.158 -0.297*** -0.164*** 
∆Xt-1 0.373*** 0.421*** 0.454*** 
∆Yt 1.114 1.058 0.374 
∆Yt-1 0.221 0.756 -0.639 
∆Zt -1.453 -1.094 -0.678 
µ -8.997 -11.156 -4.456** 
Chosen Model2   DFE 
(ii) Value of Stock Trading, 
LVTRDY (X) 
   
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 6.614*** 6.722*** 6.224*** 
Z (ALLSP) -2.949 -1.744 2.658 
Short-term Relationship    
θ -0.279*** -0.382*** -0.221*** 
∆Yt 3.606 4.164 2.999 
∆Yt-1 -2.551 -1.475** -1.039 
∆Zt -0.068 -0.212 -1.917 
µ -18.433 -28.029** -14.408*** 
Chosen Model2 PMG   
(iii)   Turnover Ratio, LTURN (X)    
 Long-term Relationship     
Y (LPPPCY) 3.628*** 3.185*** 3.5*** 
Z (ALLSP) -1.282 -1.672 -0.798 
Short-term Relationship    
θ -0.499*** -0.508*** -0.388*** 
∆Yt 1.611 1.731 1.529 
∆Yt-1 -1.886 -2.187 -0.389 
∆Zt 0.913 1.753 -0.579 
µ -18.168 -19.049*** -13.699*** 
Chosen Model2 PMG   
(iv)   Stock Market Listing, 
LLISTPOPM (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 1.444*** 0.099 -0.116 
Z (ALLSP) -1.549 0.097 1.108 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.361** -0.511 -0.287*** 
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∆Yt 1.989** 1.923** 1.78 
∆Yt-1 -0.103 0.625 0.319 
∆Zt 0.234 -0.029 -0.544 
µ -4.078 -1.141 0.932 
Chosen Model2 
 
MG  
B. Impact of Shareholder 
Protection relating to Board, 
SPBRD (Z)  
on 
 
  
(i)   Stock Market  
Capitalization , LMKAPY (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 2.887*** -0.017 2.269** 
Z  (SPBRD) 0.335 8.758 3.039 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.167*** 0.283*** -0.15*** 
∆Xt-1 0.465*** 0.44*** 0.469*** 
∆Yt 0.412 0.735 0.189 
∆Yt-1 -0.026 0.427 -0.427 
∆Yt-2 -1.324 0.205 -0.703 
∆Zt -0.146 -1.046 -0.977 
µ -4.998*** -10.505 -3.749* 
Chosen Model2 PMG   
(ii) Value of Stock Trading, 
LVTRDY (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 7.221*** 7.042*** 5.456*** 
Z (SPBRD) -3.965 0.616 4.496 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.273*** -0.382*** -0.224*** 
∆Yt 2.806 3.793 3.092 
∆Yt-1 -2.044* -1.259 -1.282 
∆Zt 0.448 0.597 -1.439 
∆Zt-1 1.642 0.899 -1.049 
µ -19.458*** -31.655*** -13.064** 
Chosen Model2 PMG   
(iii)   Turnover Ratio, LTURN (X)    
 Long-term Relationship  
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 3.583*** 3.294** 3.031*** 
Z (SPBRD) -0.878 0.249 0.919 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.479*** -0.502*** -0.38*** 
∆Yt 1.244 1.511 1.683 
∆Yt-1 -1.168 -1.337 -0.313 
∆Zt 1.204 1.911 0.072 
∆Zt-1 0.792 1.175 -0.628 
µ -0.17345*** -20.463 -11.988*** 
Chosen Model2 
 
 DFE 
(iv)   Stock Market Listing, 
LLISTPOPM (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 1.607*** 0.218 0.254 
Z (SPBRD) -1.782 -0.404 -0.304 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.368** 
 
-0.455*** -0.279*** 
∆Yt 1.879** 1.866** 1.723 
∆Yt-1 0.678 1.076 0.059 
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∆Zt 0.035 -0.06 -0.939 
∆Zt-1 1.101 0.934 0.424 
µ -4.727* -2.756 0.087 
Chosen Model2 
 
 DFE 
C.  Impact of Minority 
Shareholder Protection, SPMIN 
(Z) 
 on 
 
  
(i)      Stock Market  
Capitalization , LMKAPY (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 3.178*** 3.002** 3.207*** 
Z  (SPMIN) 0.987 10.377 1.623 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.198** -0.352*** -0.159*** 
∆Xt-1 0.462*** 0.411*** 0.471 
∆Yt 1.123* 1.363* 0.585 
∆Yt-1 -0.905*** 0.895 -0.888 
∆Zt 1.316 -0.608 0.397 
∆Zt-1 0.998 0.519 -0.065 
µ -6.636** -14.877** -5.365** 
Chosen Model2 PMG   
(ii) Value of Stock Trading, 
LVTRDY (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 5.954*** 5.633*** 6.746*** 
Z (SPMIN) -0.057 4.759 1.68 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.269*** -0.379*** -0.226*** 
∆Yt 2.806 4.159 2.74 
∆Zt 0.331 0.414 -1.792 
µ -16.432*** -26.177** -15.789*** 
Chosen Model2 PMG   
(iii)    Turnover Ratio, LTURN (X)    
 Long-term Relationship  
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 3.436*** 2.604*** 3.326*** 
Z (SPMIN) 0.082 4.307 0.172 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.529*** -0.519*** -0.41*** 
∆Yt 1.904 1.801 1.293 
∆Zt 0.677 0.386 -2.189 
∆Zt-1 -2.969 -3.272 -4.219*** 
µ -18.632*** -17.162*** -13.966*** 
Chosen Model2 PMG   
(iv)    Stock Market Listing, 
LLISTPOPM (X) 3 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 1.025*** 0.007 0.114 
Z (SPMIN) -1.084 -10.23 2.545* 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.428* -0.613*** -0.322*** 
∆Yt 1.625 1.631 2.149** 
∆Yt-1 -0.659 -0.174 0.05 
∆Zt 3.082 4.898** 0.321 
∆Zt-1 1.625 1.863 -0.175 
∆Zt-2 0.901 1.138 -1.479* 
µ -3.169* 1.832 0.071 
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Chosen Model2 
 
 DFE 
II. 1975-2005    
A.   Impact of  Aggregate Creditor 
Protection, ALLCR (Z) on 
 
  
(i) Bank Credit-GDP Ratio, 
LDCBY (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 1.855*** 1.629*** 1.898*** 
Z (ALLCR) -6.738** -2.321 -2.859 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.291 -0.519** -0.27*** 
∆Yt 0.159 0.136 0.344 
∆Yt-1 -0.751 -0.836 -0.034 
∆Zt 2.713** 1.266 0.899 
µ -3.014 -3.8*** -3.423*** 
Chosen Model2 
 
MG  
(ii) Private Credit to GDP Ratio, 
LDCPVTY (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 1.916*** 0.725** 1.237 
Z (ALLCR) -7.674*** 5.781 3.483 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ 0.276 0.477 0.218*** 
∆Yt 1.349 1.099 0.321 
∆Yt-1 0.386*** 0.316*** -0.135 
∆Zt -3.396 -1.618 -1.047 
µ 3.003 2.739 2.174 
Chosen Model2 
 
 DFE 
B.  Impact of Creditor Protection 
relating to Debtor Control, CRDC 
(X) on 
 
  
(i) Bank Credit-GDP Ratio, 
LDCBY (X)  
 
  
Long-term Relationship 0.652*** 1.05*** 1.104*** 
Y (LPPPCY) 4.738*** 3.373 1.923*** 
Z (CRDC)    
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.368 -0.644*** -0.36*** 
∆Yt -0.192 -0.285 0.283 
∆Yt-1 -0.439 -0.725 0.232 
∆Zt 0.548 -0.253*** -0.082 
µ -1.518 -5.285*** -2.669*** 
Chosen Model2 PMG   
(ii) Private Credit to GDP Ratio, 
LDCPVTY (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 0.429* 1.017*** 1.14*** 
Z (CRDC) 3.294** 3.037 2.198*** 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.314 -0.441* -0.327*** 
∆Yt -0.263 -0.295 0.502 
∆Yt-1 -0.561 -0.661 0.487 
∆Zt 0.933 0.098 -0.277 
µ -0.394 -3.195** -2.652** 
Chosen Model2 
 
 DFE 
C.   Impact of  Creditor Protection 
relating to Credit Contract 
(CRCC) on  
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(i) Bank Credit-GDP Ratio, 
LDCBY (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 1.131*** 0.932*** 1.647*** 
Z  (CRCC) -1.986** -4.407 -3.811*** 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.32* -0.616*** -0.309*** 
∆Xt-1 0.149 0.194* -0.24*** 
∆Yt -0.001 -1.122* 0.506 
∆Yt-1 -0.568 -0.527 -0.002 
∆Zt 0.229 1.351* 0.7 
µ -1.742* -0.661 -2.85*** 
Chosen Model2 
 
 DFE 
(ii) Private Credit to GDP Ratio, 
LDCPVTY (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 1.128*** 1.014*** 1.761*** 
Z  (CRCC) -2.747*** -5.089 -4.579*** 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.306 -0.564*** -0.274*** 
∆Xt-1 0.027 -0.009 -0.299*** 
∆Yt -0.137 -1.159* 0.837 
∆Yt-1 -0.966 -0.581 0.194 
∆Zt 0.419 3.05 0.544 
µ -1.563 0.212 -2.746** 
Chosen Model2 
 
 DFE 
Impact of  Creditor Protection 
relating to Insolvency, CRINS (X) 
on  
 
  
(i) Bank Credit-GDP Ratio, 
LDCBY (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 1.309*** 1.287*** 1.713*** 
Z (CRINS) -3.28*** -0.474 -1.498 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.466* -0.485** -0.274*** 
∆Yt 0.086 -0.099 0.323 
∆Yt-1 -0.573 -0.788 0.043 
∆Zt 1.254 0.827 0.245 
µ -3.115* -2.774** -3.192*** 
Chosen Model2 
 
 DFE 
(ii) Private Credit to GDP Ratio, 
LDCPVTY (X) 
 
  
Long-term Relationship 
 
  
Y (LPPPCY) 1.536*** 2.911** 1.879*** 
Z (CRINS) -4.549*** -17.314 -1.955 
Short-term Relationship 
 
  
θ -0.379* -0.375 -0.248*** 
∆Yt 0.245 -0.192 0.583 
∆Yt-1 -0.538 -0.756 0.224 
∆Zt 0.685 0.379 -0.109 
µ -3.208* -1.866** -3.293** 
Chosen Model2 
 
 DFE 
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*  Significant at 10 per cent level. 
** Significant at 5 per cent level. 
*** Significant at 1 per cent level. 
 
1 The regressors are estimated from the following long-term relationship and 
its error correction form. 
 
Long-run Relationship: 
 
Xit = ψi Yit + pii Zit   + η it 
 
Error Correction Form: 
                                                                           
                                       p-1              q-1                  r-1       
 ∆Xit = θi(η it-1) +   Σλij ∆Xi, t-j + Σψ ik ∆Y i, t-k + Σpiij ∆Zi, t-l + µi +  φit                
                                     j =1               k = 0              l=0 
 
where ∆ is the difference operator, θi is the group-specific error-correcting speed of 
adjustment term, λij,ψik  and piij are the coefficients of the lagged variables, µi  is 
the country-specific effect and  φit is the disturbances term. The existence of a 
meaningful long-run relationship with a stable adjustment dynamics requires θi < 0. 
2 An appropriate model is chosen on the basis of a series of Hausman tests. 
3 Due to non-availability of data, the period of analysis is 1980-2005. 
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Figure 1 
 
Aggregate Shareholder Protection in Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
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Figure 2 
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Aggregate Shareholder Protection, 1970-2005 
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Figure 3 
Shareholder Protection Relating to Board and Management in  
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
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Figure 4 
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Shareholder Protection Relating to Board and Management, 1970-2005 
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Figure 5 
Minority Shareholder Protection in Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
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Figure 6 
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Minority Shareholder Protection, 1970-2005 
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Figure 7 
Creditor Protection in Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
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Figure 8 
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Creditor Protection, 1970-2005 
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Figure 9 
Creditor Protection Relating to Debtors’ Control in  
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
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Figure 10  
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Creditor Protection Relating to Debtors’ Control, 1970-2005 
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Figure 11 
Creditor Protection Relating to Credit Contracts in  
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
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Figure 12  
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Creditor Protection Relating to Credit Contracts, 1970-2005 
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Figure 13 
Creditor Protection Relating to Insolvency in  
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
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Figure 14  
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Creditor Protection Relating to Insolvency, 1970-2005 
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Figure 15 
Stock Market Capitalisation (relative to GDP) in 
Four OECD Countries, 1976-2005 
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Figure 16 
Value of Stock Trading (relative to GDP) in 
Four OECD Countries, 1976-2005 
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Figure 17 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio in 
Four OECD Countries, 1976-2005 
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Figure 18 
Stock Market Listing of Firms per Million of Population in 
Four OECD Countries, 1980-2005 
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Figure 19 
Bank Credit-GDP Ratio in 
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
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Figure 20 
Private Credit-GDP Ratio in 
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
 
 
 
